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THIRD
SURVEY OF FLORIDA LAW

PART ONE
PUBLIC LAW

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
GEORGE H. PICKAR*.

This article attempts to survey the changes in Florida administrative
law that have appeared in the state statutes and judicial decisions of the
last two years.' The statutes and judicial decisions do not, of course, show
all the changes that have occurred; specifically, these sources do not show
the changes in the rules, regulations and adjudications made by the administrative agencies. 2 These administrative rules constitute law in the sense
of "policy," but as "law" their applicability is narrowly limited to the
subject matter with which the particular agency deals. This survey is
primarily concerned with those changes in administrative law which have
general application.
LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS
There have been several interesting legislative developments in Florida
administrative law since publication of the last survey in the field. Some
new agencies have been created.3 At the same time, there has been a
*

Professor Law, University of Miami School of Law.

1. The field herein surveyed includes the statutes enacted by the 36th
Florida Legislature (1957 session) and cases reported in 82 So.2d through and including
95 So.2d. Changes related to insurance or the insurance commission, workmen's
compensation, municipal corporations and taxation are omitted; they are left for
consideration in separate surveys of these topics.
2. The specific rules and regulations of each administrative agency are beyond
the scope of this survey.
See Lee, Administrative Law, 10 MIAMI L.Q. 129, 130 (1956) where the
writer discusses Chapter 29777, Laws of Florida, 1955 (now § 120.10, Florida Statutes,
1957), which provides for the filing of rules and regulations of administrative bodies
with the Secretary of State, and for dissemination by him of this information to the
interested public.
3. E.g., Florida Watchmakers' Comm'n., FiA. STAT.
§ 489.01-14 (1957);
Florida State Board of Examiners of Psychology, id. §§ 400.01-09; Florida Air Pollution
Control Comm'n., id. §§ 403.01-21.
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noticeable and constructive tendency to meet needs through expansion of

existing agencies rather than by creating new ones.4 There have also been
several changes in the existing old line agencies.5 Some of these changes
reflect a more realistic attitude concerning the relationship between the
legislative and the administrative branches of government as well as an
awareness of the need to modernize administrative procedures. Only one
agency, the Board of Naturopathic Examiners, was abolished.6

NEw

ADIMINISTRATIVE

AcENCIES

The practical social and economic developments of the last few years
have stimulated the legislature to formulate and establish many new governmental policies and to create additional administrative machinery to
effect these policies. Some of the new agencies have been vested with

rule-making and adjudicatory powers; others have not been granted these
powers.7 In this survey our primary interest lies in the former type of
agency.
Florida State Board of Examiners of Psychology
Florida Statutes §§490.01-.09 (1957) regulates the right to engage
in the practice of "psychologist" 8 and creates the Florida State Board of
Examiners of Psychology composed of qualified Florida psychologists to
administer the statutory provisionsY In broad outline this statute follows
the familiar plan for regulating the right to engage in the supervised
4. E.g., State Board of Medical Examiners, page 271 infra; Florida State
Board of Dental Examiners, page 271 infra; State Board of Conservation, page 272
infra.

5. E.g., Florida Railroad and Public Utilities Comm'n., page 268 infra; Fla.
Citrus Comm'n. page 269 infra; State Bd. of Osteopathic Medical Examiners,
page 270 infra.
6. See page 273 infra.
7. Among the agencies vested with neither rule-making nor adjudicatory power
are the following: Florida Comm'n. on Constitutional Government, which was created
to deal with the problem of invasions of State sovereignty by federal government,
(Chapter 57-797); the Governor's Advisory Comm'n. of Race Relations, (Chapter
57-315); the Governor's Mansion Comm'n created to supervise and maintain structures,
furnishings, equipment and grounds of the Governor's residence, (Chapter 57-61); the
Florida Nuclear Development Comm'n created to deal with certain matters in the
field of nucleonics and in addition to further the industrial development of Florida
by attracting to the state new industries based on nuclear science and engineering,
(Chapter 57-178); and the Florida Educational Television Comm'n created to help
raise the educational level of citizens and residents of the state by means of educational
television, (Chapter 57-312).
The legislature has also created one new commission having the power to enact
rules for the guidance of governmental agencies. Chapter 57-17 creates the State
Purchasing Comm'n to effect economy and efficiency in state purchasing. The commission has been empowered to make purchasing rules for the guidance of all state
agencies. However, this rule-making power is intra-govcrnmental in nature.
8. FLA. STAT. § 490.01 (1957). A person comes within the purview of the
act if he holds himself out to the public by any title incorporating the words "psychological," "psychologist," or "psychology" and under such titles offers to render or
renders services to individuals or to the public for remuneration.
9. FLA. STAT. § 490.03 (1957).

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
occupations and professions. The right is limited to persons holding
certificates of registration issued by the board. 10 Applicants for registration
12
must be citizens of the United States" of good moral character able to
1
fulfill the statutory requirements as to education and experience ' and to
5
pass an examination described in the statute.' Certificates of registration
6
are revocable for causes specified in the statute' after notice and hearings."
Some of the features of this statute make it different from its phenotypes in the local regulatory scene. The statute authorizes reciprocal
9
certification' s under certain circumstances and also waiver of examination.'
for the manner
In addition it makes the board accountable to the state
2°
in which it exercises the police power entrusted to it.
Florida Watchmakers' Commission
Florida Statutes §§489.01-11 (1957) is the most recent attempt in
this state to control by a system of examination the right of the individual
to engage in an ordinary commercial occupation having no relation to
public health, safety or morals. This statute creates the Florida Watchmakers' Commission 2' and attempts to limit and control the occupation
of watchmaking and watch repair. The statute makes it unlawful for

10. FLA.
11. FLA.

12.

STAT.
STAT.
FLA. STAT.
FLA. STAT.

§ 490.02, 490.04(1) (1957).
§ 490.04(1) (b) (1957).
§ 490.04(1) (a) (1957).

§ 490.04(l) (c) (1957). The statute requires a Ph.D. with a
13.
major in psychology from a university approved by the board or an equivalent degree
in a field of psychology from a similarly approved university. The constitutionality of
a statute prescribing a course of study and examination for drugless practitioners
employing faith, hope and the processes of mental suggestion and adjustment was
upheld over forty years ago against an attack under the Fourteenth Amendment of
the Federal Constitution, particularly the equal protection clause. See Crane v. Johnson,
242 U.S. 339 (1917).
14. FLA. STAT. § 490.04(1) (d) (1957). At least one (1) year's experience
in the field of psychology of a grade, character, and time distribution satisfactory to
the board is required.
15. FLA. STAT. § 490.04(1) (1957). The statute prescribes a representative
assembled written, and an oral or practical examination in psychology, or both such
oral and practical examinations.
16. FLA. STAT. § 490.08(1) (1957). The causes are conviction of a felony,
fraud or deceit in obtaining a certificate, or professional misconduct.
17. Ibid.
18. FLA. STAT. § 490.09 (1957).
19. FLA. STAT. § 490.05 (1957). Applicants who possess the education and
experience qualifications prior to two years after the enactment of the statute are
eligible for certification without examination. Applicants who cannot meet the Ph.D
requirement but have received the Master's Degree in psychology prior to three years
before such enactment and have had six years of experience may, in the discretion
of the Board, be certificated without examination.
20. FLA. STAT. § 490.03(6) (1957). The board is required to make complete
annual reports of its transactions to the governor with such recommendations for the
advancement and betterment of the profession as it may think best. This is in addition
to the report of receipts and expenditures usually required to be made by administrative
agencies.
21. FLA. STAT. § 489.03 (1957). The commission is composed of five members
each of whom has followed the occupation of watchmaking in this state for at least
five (5) years immediately prior to his appointment.
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anyone to engage in this occupation without obtaining from the commission and maintaining in force a certificate of registration. 2 A newcomer
to the local trade cannot obtain a certificate unless he passes an examination2 l for which he is ineligible unless he is of good character 24 and has
served an apprenticeship 25 or attended a school approved by the board.20
No provision is made for reciprocal certification or waiver of examination
in the case of skillful workmen of long experience and good character.
Established watchmakers and watch repairmen practicing locally may obtain
certificates of registration without prior apprenticeship, schooling or examination irrespective of the quality of their personal character.27 Certificates of registration are subject to revocation after notice and hearing28
for causes specified in the statute. 2 These include, inter alia, "unethical
conduct" defined in such manner as to restrain certain competitive practices 0 and to give the commission inordinate powers of interference with
employment and livelihood of individuals. 3 '
32
The examination features of the statute are probably unconstitutional.

22. FLA. STAT. § 489.02, 489.06, (1957).
23. FLA. STAT. § 489.05 (1957). 'he examination includes theoretical knowledge
of watch and clock construction and repair and also a practical demonstration of the
applicant's skill in the manipulation and use of watchmaker's tools. The commission
prescribes the standards of workmanship and skill required of watchmakers receiving its
certificates.
24. FLA. STAT. § 489.04 (1957).
25. Ibid. Apprenticeship is for a period of eighteen (18) months.
26. FLA. STAT. § 489.04 (1957). Schooling must be for a period of not less
than six (6) months, a certificate must have been issued by said school, and the
school must have been one heretofore approved by the commission, except that any
school in Florida in operation upon the effective date of the statute is given a reasonable
time within which to meet the requirements fixed by the commission.
27. FLA. STAT. § 489.06(2) (1957). Persons actually engaged in watchmaking
within the state on the effective date of the statute are exempt from taking the
examination and are eligible for a certificate of registration within six (6) months of
said date upon application, proof of occupation and payment of a ten ($10.00) dollar
fee. Florida watchmakers with the Armed Forces on the effective date of the statute are
eligible for certification without examination for a period of six months after discharge
under the same conditions as above.
28. FLA. STAT. § 489.09 (1957).
29. FLA. STAT. § 489.09(1) (1957). The causes are (1) obtaining a certificate
of registration through error of the commission; or (2) fraud on the part of the applicant;
or (3) gross incompetence of the holder; or (4) guilt of unethical conduct; or (5)
obtaining or seeking to obtain anything of value by fraudulent representations in the
practice30.ofFLA.
watchmaking.
STaT.
489.09(3) (1957). Advertising of any character
in which
untruthful or misleading statements are made; advertising of prices on watch repairing
or the giving of any watch or clock parts gratis or at less than cost with intent to
deceive the public; performance of any service pursuant to such advertising; representing that a watch has been cleaned unless its major parts, train wheels and mainspring have been disassembled and the cap jewels removed and all parts properly
cleaned are included in the definition.
31. Ibid. A watchmaker who fails to comply with written notice from the commission to terminate the employment of any person whom the commission says is
violating the statute risks revocation of his certificate.
32. An interesting constitutional question is also raised by the provision of the
statute authorizing license revocation for "unethical conduct" as therein defined. See
note 30 suPTa,.
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Since the legislative purpose in adopting the statute is not related to
the promotion of the public health or safety, the validity under the police
power of the restrictions on personal liberty inherent in the examinations
depends upon whether they are measures in the public welfare. From this
standpoint the strongest argument that can be made in support of validity
is that the use of knowledge and skill is required in the practice of watchmaking and watch repair, and that minimum standards of proficiency fixed
by law would be in the public interest. However, the courts have tended
to take the position that the need for knowledge and skill in the practice
of an ordinary gainful occupation is not of itself a sufficient basis for
legislation curtailing by restrictive mental, moral or technical examination
the freedom of the individual to select and engage in an occupation of
his choice. 8 They have evidently placed a higher value on the liberty of
the individual in this field than upon any improvement in the quality of
workmanship that could result from fixing standards of knowledge and
skill by state action. Implicit in this position is the idea that with regard
to the ordinary gainful occupations, the public is protected against incompetence with reasonable adequacy by the interplay of natural economic
forces and indirect legal influences; and that in a democratic society the
public welfare is best served by the compromise between liberty and
restraint which these produce. In line with this view, several courts
including Florida have held to be unconstitutional statutes restricting the
right to engage in the commercial practice of photography to those who
pass mental and moral examinations. 3 4 In State ex. rel. Whetsel v. Wood, 5
the Oklahoma Supreme Court also held to be unconstitutional the examination provisions of a watchmaker statute substantially similar to the Florida
watchmaker legislation. The court concluded that there is no greater
justification for requiring a watchmaker to pass a test as to his technical
qualifications than for requiring a photographer to pass such a test.36
Florida Air Pollution Control Commission
Florida Statutes §§403.01-.21 (1957) is the new Florida Air Pollution
Control Act. It establishes the Florida Air Pollution Control Commission
in the state board of health. 37 This commission is probably the most
important new. administrative agency that the legislature has created in
33. Sullivan v. De Cerb, 156 Fla. 496, 23 So.2d 571 (1945); State ex. el.
Whetsel v. Wood, 207 Okl. 193, 248 P.2d 612 (1952); State v. Ballance 229 N.C. 764,
51 S.E.2d 731 (1949); Buebman v. Bechtel, 57 Ariz. 363, 114 P.2d 227 (1941);
Branley v. State 187 Ga. 826, 2 S.E.2d 647 (1939); State v. Cromwell 72 N.D. 565,
9 N.W.26 914 (1943); Moore v. Sutton, 185 Va. 481, 39 S.E.2d 348 (1946).
34. Sullivan v. De Cerb, note 33 supra; State v. Ballance, note 33 supra; Buchman
v. Bechtel, note 33 supra; Bramley v. State, note 33 supra; State v. Cromwell, notJ 33
supra; Moore v. Sutton, note 33 supra.
35. State ex. rel. Whetsel v. Wood, note 33 supra.
36. Id. at 616.
37. FrL.ASTAT. § 403.03 (1957). The act allocates functions and powers to both
the Air Pollution Control Comm'n and the State Board of Health.
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many years. Working in cooperation with the board of health, its function
is to deal with problems arising from the introduction into the atmosphere
of undesirable substances in quantities which are injurious to human, plant
and animal life by the technical operations of some of the newer industries
that have come to Florida. 88 The ordinary legal forms of dealing with
public nuisances such as injunction, damages, or penalties are inadequate
in the situation by reason of the discouraging effect that the employment
of such abrupt and hostile remedies would be likely to have upon the
industrial development of the state. The task is to find means of protecting the public against these harmful nuisances without driving industry
out of the state or discouraging industry from coming into it. The flexibility
with which an administrative agency can operate makes it particularly
appropriate for the job.
The commission functions by creating air control districts, 89 promulgating rules for the control of air pollution in such air control districts, 40

adjudicating whether there has been a violation of such rules, 41 fixing a
time period during which corrective measures shall be taken where the
commission has determined that there is a violation and instituting court
action to eliminate the public nuisance when industry refuses to take steps
2
to eliminate or satisfactorily control the nuisance.4

The eminently fair and friendly way in which each of these steps
is required to be taken and the way the commission's power has been
circumscribed reveals the nature of the task and the peculiar appropriateness for it of the administrative process.
First, the statute limits the right to control air pollution to pollution
in an air control district.' 3 Before such a district can be created, notice
of hearing must be given and a public hearing must be held on the question
of whether it should be created 44 Particularly important in this connection
is the statutory command that "no such district shall be created or dissolved
by the commission unless a necessity thereof is established by a preponderance of evidence introduced at the hearing.' 4
Second, control of air pollution in any air control district is limited
to control by rules and regulations adopted by the commission."8 Before
making such rules and regulations the commission must give notice of
47
hearings and hold hearings on whether the proposed rules shall be adopted.
In this connection administrative action is circumscribed by a statutory
38. FLA. STAT. §§ 403.02(3), 403.10 (1957).
39.

FLA. STAT.

§

403.12 (1957).

40. FLA. STAT. § 403,09 (1957).
41. FLA. STAT. § 403,17 (1957).
42. FLA. STAT. § 403,18 (1957).
'43. F. STAT. § 403.09(1) (b)(1957),
44. FLA. STAT. § 403.12 (1957).
45. FLA. STAT. § 403.12 (c)(1957).
46. FLA. STAT. § 403.10 (1957).
47. FLA. STAT. §403.09(1) (b) (1957).
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command that "no rule or regulation shall be adopted unless a need for
such action is shown' 4 by a preponderance of the evidence introduced at
such public hearing. '
Third, while the board of health is vested with certain powers to
inspect facilities and to require technical information, the statute limits
the authority of the board in the performance of this part of its function
in several ways. Where the board requires reports to be filed, the requirement "shall be conditioned upon either the consent of the person employed
in operations which result in air pollution or the direction of the board,
which direction may be issued only after a hearing upon notice to the
person engaged in such opcration."4' The right to cuter and inspect
premises is conditioned upon "either the consent of the owner or lessee
of the premises or the direction of the board, which direction may be
issued only after hearing upon notice to the owner or lessee of the premises."' ' Before entering and inspecting, the inspector is required to "sign
a statement in the presence of and witnessed by a notary public or other
officer qualified to take acknowledgement, that all information shall be
kept confidential except as it relates directly to air pollution."'"' Samples
taken for analysis "shall be taken in the presence of a representative of
the company" and "a duplicate of the analytical report shall2 be furnished
promptly to time person suspected of causing air pollution.''
Fourth, proceedings to eliminate air pollution where it is thought to
exist in violation of commission rules and regulations may be *instituted
by a complaint filed with the board or by the board itself. 3 In connection
with such proceedings the board is required to "endeavor to eliminate any
source or cause of air pollution resulting from such violation by conferences,
conciliation and persuasion."5 4 Should the board fail to correct or remedy
the alleged violation by such means, a hearing is held before the commission. \Vhere the commission finds that air pollution exists in violation
of a previously established rule or regulation, it is required to fix a reasonable
time during which the respondent may take necessary measures to eliminate
the hazard.5 5 The commission may require periodic reports of progress,
but in such case the statute commands that any information as to secret
processes or methods of manufacture or production revealed by such
progress reports shall be kept confidential. "5 Where such preventive or
corrective measures are not taken, the commission is authorized to institute
legal proceedings in any court of competent jurisdiction for injunctive
48. Ibid.
49. FLA. STAT. § 403.10(3) (1957).

50.

FLA. STAT.

§ 403.10(4) (1957).

51. Ibid.
52. Ibid.
53. FLA. STAT. §§ 403.13, 403.14 (19571.
i4. F A. STAT. § 403.13 (1957).
;;,
IA, STAT. § 403.17 (1957).
56. Ibid,
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relief and the courts are empowered to grant such relief upon complaint
by the commission. 7
The statute provides for judicial review by a circuit court of any order
of the commission, including orders creating air control districts and orders
promulgated for the control of air pollution, at the instance of any person
whose interest is substantially affected thereby. Judicial review is confined
to an examination of the record of the proceedings including a transcript
of the evidence. 8 In such review, the statute provides that no presumption
shall arise as to the correctness of the action of the commission iii creating
or dissolving an air control district or in entering any order or in adopting,
repealing or determining the reasonableness of any rule or regulation.,,
Appeals to the appropriate district court of appeal may be taken from the
final order of the circuit court.60
LEGISLATIVE C

cANGES
IN EXISTING AGENCIES

Many of Florida's administrative agencies are products of an early
period in the history of the development of this state's administrative law. 1
Legislative attitudes of caution and distrust of the process typical of that
period, together with the inexperience of legislators, produced some unfortunate consequences. In some instances the legislature would create an
administrative agency, adopt standards, and then proceed inappropriately
to implement the standard in the statute by an abundance of detailed
rules related to the technical minutiae of the subject.6 2 In other instances
the legislature would create an administrative agency, adopt rules in the
statute for the guidance of the agency, and then authorize the agency to
make similar rules. 3 In still other instances the legislature would create
an agency and then circumscribe agency activity by means of fixed rules
which eliminated all discretion in cases where the proper performance of
the task assigned required the exercise of some discretion. 4
Some of the changes affecting existing agencies which were made by
the 36th legislature consist of constructive attempts to remedy such defects.
Florida Railroad and Public Utilities Commission
Chapter 57-1160s vests the Florida Railroad and Public Utilities Commission with discretionary power to employ the prehearing conference
57. Fz .
58. FLA.
59, Ibid.

STAT.
S'rAT.

§ 403.18 (1957).

§ 403.19(4) (1957).

60. FLA. STAT. § 403.19(5) (1957).
61. E.g., the Barber's Sanitary Cormm'n (1939); the Florida Citrus Comm'n
(1935); the Board of Osteopathic Medical Examiners (1927); the Florida Railroad and
ublic Utilities Comrnm'n (1899).
62. E.g., The Florida Citrus Code, FLA. STAT. §§ 601.16-23 (1957).
63. E.g., the Barber's Sanitary Comm'n, I'LA. STAT. §§ 476.17-32 (1957).
64. E.g., the Board of Osteopathic Medicine, FLA. STAT. § 459.05 (1957).
65. FLA. STAT. § 350.631 (1957).
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procedure in exercise of its judicial functions. The prehearing conference
procedure is not new. For many years this tool has been standard equipment of courts and federal administrative agencies exercising adjudicatory
powers for expediting or eliminating trials and hearings. 66 What is new
is its introduction into the Florida administrative process.
The innovation will aid in expediting the work of the Railroad and
Public Utility Commission whose burden has been sharply increasing, but
the importance of the change to the development of Florida's administrative process transcends this benefit. It indicates recognition of the fact
that the virtue of speed which is frequently ascribed to the administrative
process, and for which it is sometimes praised as the "modern" method
of government, is not an indestructible virtue inherent in that process. That
virtue is destroyed when agencies become saddled with work loads exceeding
their capacity to perform with reasonable dispatch.
The Florida Citrus Commission
Several legislative changes have been made expanding the authority
of the Florida Citrus Commission. The significant changes for present
purposes are those which attempt to rectify shortcomings of the Florida
Citrus Code with respect to the authority of the Florida Citrus Commission
over maturity and quality standards for citrus fruit intended for the out-ofstate market.67
As originally enacted, the Florida Citrus Code, after adopting maturity
and quality standards for citrus, proceeded to specify in detail the technical
minutiae thereof; such as, how many cubic centimeters of juice a grapefruit
must have. The Florida Citrus Commission was givcn almost no authority
with respect to these matters as they affected the out of state market. The
following is illustrative of some of the consequences:
Chapter 57-12 amends section 601.19 Florida Statutes and makes the
following innocuous changes: (1) Size sixty-four grapefruit no longer need
have 265 centimeters of juice to meet the standard, but now meets it with
255 centimeters; (2) between October 16 and November 1 of the following year that size grapefruit now gets by with 240 centimeters against the
old rule of 250 between October 1 and November 15; (3) between March 2
and July 31 of the same year that size now needs only 230 centimeters as
against 240 formerly required between November 16 and July 31 of the
following year. The commission is now authorized to decrease the juice
content requirements if unusual conditions are found to exist between
October 16, 'and March 1 (four and one half months) instead of for the
much shorter time period of October 16 and November 15 (one month).

66. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16; Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1. 16.
67. FLA. STAT. §§ 601,16-25 (1957).
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The importance of the amendment in Chapter 57-12 for present purposes lies not in what it advises about grapefruit, hut in what it reveals
about the administration of Florida's citrus policy. Arc these the kind of
things that a legislature charged with the heavy responsibility of formulating
policy for a great state should be concerned with, or are they more
appropriately the task of an administrative agency? Certainly such an
agency could provide flexibility, expedient action, and skillful judgment
which a legislature cannot provide. Is piecemeal delegation of additional
authority to the administrative process, as exemplified in the above amendnent, a satisfactory way of solving the problem?
Two significant developnents appear which may lay the foundation for
changes of paramount importance to the future administration of Florida's
citrus policy. First, the legislature has expressly recognized some of the
advantages of delegating the regulation of quality standards to the administrative process and in that statute 8 turned over what appears to be the
whole job of raising quality standards in the frozen concentrated orange
juice segment of the citrus industry to the Florida Citrus Commission and
a new advisory commission composed of represcntativcs of that segment of
the industry, jointly. Second, Chapters 57-1469 and Chapters 57-3 0 "'
authorize the commission to "establish . . . minimum maturity and quality

standards for citrus fruits not inconsistent with existing laws."
Barbers' Sanitary Commission
Chapter 57-134 amends Chapter 476.22 Florida Statutes to read, in
part, that the Barbers' Sanitary Commission may from time to time make
recommendations to the legislature to protect the public health in barber
shops. Prior to this amendment, the commission was authorized to "make"
rules and regulations and "prescribe" sanitary requirements in addition to
those made and prescribed by the legislature, subject to the approval of
the state board of health. A power to recommend rules and regulations
has been substituted for a power to make and prescribe them subject to
the board of health's approval."
Florida Board of Osteopathic Medical Examiners
Among other changes Chapter 57-241 amends Chapter 459 Florida
Statutes which created the Florida State Board of Osteopathic Medical
Examiners. One amendment substitutes a flexible standard for fixed rules
with respect to the subjects embraced by the examination which must be
taken by applicants for certification to practice as osteopathic physicians.

68. Laws of Florida c. 57-332.
69. Laws of Florida c. 57-14, amending FLA. STAT. § 601.10 (1955).
70. Laws of Florida c. 57-38, amending FLA. SAV. § 601.11 (19%).
71. FLA. STAr. § 476.22 (1955).
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The earlier section 459.07 Florida Statutes (1955) listed the subjects of
examination, but failed to take into account future advancement of know].
edge and the possibility of changes in curricula at colleges of osteopathy.
The amendment makes possible administrative adjustment to such changes
by providing that the examination shall embrace those subjects which are
found by the board to be taught in standard colleges of osteopathy and
are set forth in its regulations.
Florida Board of Medical Examiners-Physical Therapy
Other changes made by the legislature during the 1957 session broaden
the power of existing agencies to enable them to perform additional functions which would otherwise require the creation of new agencies.
Instead of creating a new agency, the legislature broadened the powers
of the State Board of Medical Examiners by authorizing it to register
physical therapists as defined by the Physical Therapy Practice Act. 3 It
is unlawful for a person who is not registered by the board as a physical
therapist to represent in any manner or by any means that he is a physical
therapist. To qualify for registration an applicant must have had special
training in physical therapy as outlined in the statute and lie must pass
5
an examination which is given with the aid of registered physical therapists?
76
Provision is made for registration without examination in proper cases. The
of registration after notice and
statute authorizes suspension or revocation
7
therein
prescribed
reasons
for
hearing
Florida State Board of Dental Examiners-DentalLaboratories
Chapter 57-242'1 broadens the authority of the Florida State Board
of Dental Examiners to effect a policy of bringing dental laboratories as
therein defined under the police power control of the state for the first
time. The stated object and purpose of the statute "is to safeguard the
public health by requiring that only qualified dental laboratories be permitted to operate in this state.'t 79 The object is accomplished by a regis80
No
tration system under control of the Board of Dental Examiners.
8
such
any
revoke
or
suspend
may
examination is required. ' The board
72. Other changes include giving osteopathic physicians and surgeons equal rights
with other schools of medical practice; increasing the requirements for renewals of
licenses to practice osteopathic medicine and surgery; and providing certain penalties
for failure to renew such licenses.
73. Laws of Florida c. 57-67: an act providing for the practice of physical
therapy ... and repealing FLA. STAT. § 486 (1951).
74. Id. § 10.
75. Id. § 5.
76. Id. §§ 7, 8.
77. Id. § 9.
78. FLA. STAT.
79. FLA. STAT.

§§ 466.50-58 (1957).
§ 466.50 (1957).

80. Id. § 466.52,
81. Id. § 466.53.
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certificate of registration after notice and hearing for failure to comply
2
with this act or Chapter 466 Florida Statutes.
State Board of Conservation-Weather Modification
Chapter 57-128 broadens the powers of the State Board of Conservation
to enable that board to effect a new legislative policy of regulating the
83
occupation commonly described as "rain making" or "weather modifying."
Regulation is by a licensing system. 84 The board is required to issue a
license to applicants who "appear to be qualified" by education, skill and
experience and file proof of financial responsibility. 5 By the terms of the
license the licensee is required to notify the board of intention to conduct
an operation and to provide it with specified information with relation
thereto.86 He is also required to give prescribed notice to the public.87 The
board is authorized to revoke or suspend licenses for failure to comply
with the provisions of the act.88 Provision is made for notice, hearing and
judicial review in suspension and revocation proceedings. 0
State Board of Conservation-Departmentof Water Resources
Chapter 57-38090 expands the powers of the State Board of Conservation to include a Department of Water Resources to implement a legislative policy of affecting maximum beneficial utilization, development and
conservation of the water resources of the state and to prevent waste and
unreasonable use thereof."' The department is administered by a director
who is appointed by and is directly responsible to the board. 2
The board is authorized to create and dissolve water development and
conservation districts as necessary to serve the purposes of the act.0 3 It is
empowered to adopt reasonable rules and regulations and to issue reasonable
orders to govern the conservation and use of water resources of a district.04
Notice and hearing are prerequisites to the establishment or dissolution
of water development and conservation districts, and to the promulgation
of rules, regulations and orders. 5 The findings of fact at such hearings
must be supported by a preponderance of the evidence." Any final action
82. Id. § 466.55.
83. FLA. STAT. §§ 373.261-391 (1957).

84. FLA. STAT. §§ 373.291, 373.301, 373.311 (1957).
85. Ibid,

86.
87.
88.
89.

Id. § 373.321.

Id. § 373.341.
Id. § 373.381.
Ibid.

90. FLA. STAT. §§ 373.071-.251 (1957).
91. Id. § 373.101.

92. Id. §373.121.

93. Id. § 373.141(2).
94. Id. § 373.171.

95. Ibid.
96. Ibid.
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of the board, affirmative or negative, is subject to judicial review.

7

State Board of Naturopathic Examiners
In only one instance did the legislature abolish an administrative
agency; chapter 57-129 abolishes the State Board of Naturopathic Examiners.9 8 The change stemmed from a change in legislative policy with
respect to the practice of naturopathy. Under the new policy only those
persons who on the effective date of the statute were licensed as naturopathic
physicians and had previously been engaged in active practice in Florida
for a period of two years or more are permitted to practice. The administrative functions formerly exercised by the State Board of Naturopathic
Examiners with respect to license suspension, revocation and annulment
have been vested in the state board of health.
JUDICIAL DECISIONS
The supreme court decided a substantial number of cases dealing
with questions of administrative law in the period under review. These
concerned, inter alia, the beverage commission, the citrus commission, the
board of dental examiners, the game and fresh water fish commission, the
hotel and restaurant commission, the industrial commission, the livestock
board, the milk commission, the board of pharmacy, the plant board and
the railroad and public utilities commission. Many of these were decisions
of a routine nature dealing with sundry topics in the field. In some of
them, however, the court made important modifications, clarifications, or
interesting applications of the law.
JurcraL REVIEW
The law as to the proper proceeding to obtain judicial review of
administrative action when the appropriate statute either fails to provide
for such review or to indicate the method has for a long time been in an
unsatisfactory condition. Generally, the court has distinguished between
quasi-judicial, quasi-legislative and quasi-executive action and has indicated
that the type of action to be reviewed is often determinative of the method
of obtaining review. But the lines separating these types of action are
vague. In addition, judicial review of quasi-judicial action has been allowed
uncritically in both mandamus, an original proceeding, and certiorari, an
appellate proceeding, thus adding to the confusion. In the recent case of
DeGroot v. Sheffield", the court took an important step in correcting this
situation. Defining "quasi-judicial" as an action for which notice and hearing
97. FLA. STAT. § 373.161 (1957).
98. Laws of Fla. c. 57-129, amending FLA.
§§ 462.02-09 (1955).
99. 95 So.2d 912 (Fla. 1957).

STAT. §

462.01 (1955) and repealing
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are required by law, the court held that judicial review of quasi-judicial
administrative action may no longer be had in mandamus proceedings and
indicated that certiorari is the correct proceeding for this purpose. In
DeGroot v. Sheffield, review was sought in a proceeding collateral to the
one in which the administrative order was promulgated. The opinion
makes it clear, however, that the court meant to interdict review by
mandamus in direct proceedings as well. The burden of the court's argument was directed at the inappropriatencss of mandamus proceedings for
purposes of appellate review rather than at the indirectness of the challenge
to the administrative order in that case. As a consequence of this decision
cases like Williams v. Whitman,0 " in which judicial review of an order
of the Florida State Board of Dental Examiners revoking a dentist's license
was successfully obtained in mandamus proceedings, must be regarded as
repudiated.
DeCGroot v.Sheffield is more than a signpost indicating the correct
route to judicial review in the limited class of cases we are here considering.
In the past the court on judicial review in mandamus proceedings has
customarily reexamined the evidence and exercised an independent judgment on the facts. 10 1 In certiorari proceedings, on the other hand, it has
traditionally concerned itself only with questions of law and examined the
record merely to determine whether the administrative proceeding satisfied
legal requirements, including the rule that the findings of fact must be
supported by substantial competent evidence. 1 2 The elimination of mandamus appreciably narrows the scope of court review and may mark a
fundamental change in the attitude of the court towards the administrative
process and the function of the court in relation to it.
A short time after the decision in DeGroot v, Sheffield, the supreme
court adopted the final draft of the Florida Appellate Rules, effective
July 1, 1957. Rule 4.1 provides that "All appellate review of the rulings
of any commission or board shall be by certiorari as provided by the Florida
Appellate Rules." This rule adopts the idea experienced in DeCroot v.
Sheffield and widens its application to include all cases where the review is
in exercise of the court's appellate jurisdiction as distinguished from original

100. 116 Fla. 196, 156 So.705 (1934).

101. See the language in Williams v. Whitman, note 100 supra. This customary
procedure was also followed by the circuit court in De Groot v. Sheffield, note 99 supra.
102. This was the common law rule. See JAFFE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw (1955) at
p. 497: In certiorari
the only questions open are those going to the legality
of the
action on the basis of the record below.
To substantially the same effect, see Justice Thornal's opinion in De Groot v.
Sheffield, note 99 supra at p. 916.
But see Fla. Motor Lines Inc. v. RR. Commissioners, 100 Fla. 538, 558,
129 So. 876,880 (1930) and DAVIs, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (1951) at p. 786. The author
points out that in the latter ease, a certiorari proceeding, "the court substituted judgment
on the decisive question of policy."
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jurisdiction, at least where no other method of review is prescribed by
statute.
There is need for a single all-service flexible proceeding for appellate
review of administrative action generally. In some states steps have already
been taken to satisfy this need. To provide such a proceeding is the
substantial effect of the New York revision which has substituted for
certiorari, mandamus and prohibition a so-called "proceeding to review the
determination of a board or officer."' 1 3 In New Jersey the state constitution
provides for a single proceeding, the character of which is within the
paramount control of the Supreme Court of New Jersey. 10' In Florida,
Justice Drew in lickey v. XVelfs,'0 5 as well as Justice Thornal in DeGroot v.
Sheffield, I°8 have pointed out the need for reform in this area. Rule 4.1 of
the Florida Appellate Rules is an important step in the direction of procedural uniformity, but as Justice Drew pointed out in Hickey v. Vells,"",
legislation to this end would be desirable.
ADMINISTRATIVE FINDINGS OF FACT

In Florida, administrative action of a quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial
nature must be predicated upon specific findings of fact.0 8 This requirement exists to facilitate judicial review. Without specific findings the
court is compelled to grope in the dark and to guess the inferences which
the agency drew from the evidence and the factual basis upon which it
predicated its conclusions of law.' 09 Review that is not on specific findings
of fact is likely to result in the substitution of judicial discretion for
administrative discretion in weighing the evidence and drawing inferences
therefrom. The findings when properly made are not only indicative that
the agency has given careful consideration to the evidence in reaching its
conclusion, but are valuable aids to the parties in preparing their cases
for rehearing or judicial review.
In the recent case of Hiekey v. Wells'10 the court held invalid an
order of the Florida State Board of Dental Examiners suspending Dr.
I-Iicky's license for a period of three years on charges of illegal practice
of the dental profession. One of the grounds of this decision was that
the board's findings of fact failed to meet the legal requirement in this
103. New York Civil Practice Act, Article 78, §§ 1283-96.
104. N.J. CoNsT. art VI § 5 Par. 4: "Prerogative writs are superseded and in

lieu thereof, review, hearing and relief shall be afforded."

105. 91 So.2d 206 (Fla. 1957).
106. 95 So.2d 912 (Fla. 1957),
107. See note 105 supra.
108 Laney v. Holbrook, 150 Fla. 622, 8 So.2d 465 (1942); Hickey v. Wells, note
105 supra. In Laney v. Holbrook, the findings were required as a matter of due process
of law.

The idea that the constitution requires findings has not escaped criticism: see

DAvis, ADMINISTRATIE LAw (1951)

at p. 526.
109. See Justice Drew's opinion in Hickey v. Vells, note 105 supra.

110. 91 So.2d 206 (Fla. 1957).
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regard. Such findings of fact as there were in this case were contained
in the administrativc order and an affidavit which the board attempted to
incorporate by reference in the order. The substance of the material portion
of the order was that the board had considered the evidence and Dr. Hickey
was guilty as charged in the affidavit. The material part of the affidavit
was that Dr. Hickey had violated provisions of Chapter 466 Florida Statutes
by cmploying and knowingly aiding one John Johnson, who was unlicensed
to practice dentistry, to perform dental work at Dr. Hickey's office. The
court held that the findings of the board in this case amounted to no more
than a finding of guilty as charged in the affidavit and that the statements

in the affidavit did not provide adequate findings of fact when adopted
for that purpose by the board.
In Laney v. Holbrook"' the court had earlier held that a general
verdict of guilty was not sufficiently specific to meet this requirement under
a statute requiring an agency to make specific findings of fact. In the
Hickey case, which was concerned with a substantially similar agency finding, the court reached the same conclusion on the basis of the administrative comon law. The court in the Hickey case was not called upon to
decide whether the adoption by reference of the statements in the affidavit
as the agency's findings of fact would have been adequate if the affidavit
had contained statelents sufficient in number and kind to meet legal
requirements. The decision was that such a requirement was not satisfied
whether or not the statements in the affidavit were treated as part of the
order. The question here posed was apparently not raised. The court's
opinion seems to assume that insuch event the findings would have been
adequate.
ADN IzNIS'IRATIVE HEARINGS
-'
'

Hiekey v. Wells" also clarifies some important matters concerning
notice of charges and fair hearings in license revocation proceedings. The
earlier view on notice of charges was that notice which informs the accused
with reasonable certainty of the nature and cause of the accusation against
him is sufficient. The Hickey case takes the position that such notice is
inadequate unless it also specifies with particularity the acts complained
of, at least where agency procedures fail to provide a method of obtaining
such disclosure from the agency. On the question of fair hearing, an
earlier case held that a hearing which is fairly and impartially conducted
and affords a reasonable opportunity to defend against attempted proof of

the charges satisfies the legal requirement."13 The Hickey case indicates
that the legal requirement is not satisfied unless in addition to the forcgoing the accused has also been given a fair chance to prepare a defense
111. 150 Fla. 622, 8 So.2d 465 (1942).
112. See note 110 supra
113. State ex. rel. Sbordy v. Rowlett, 125 Fla. 562 at 569, 170 So. 311 at 313 (1936).
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to the attempted proof of the charges. The court held that the notice
of charges and the hearing were inadequate because the notice did not
specify with particularity the person upon whom or the time when the
illegal dentistry was practiced; the failure to provide this information
denied Dr. Hickey a fair chance to prepare a defense against the attempted
proof.
PREVENrING ADMINISTRATIvE

AcrioN

In a few cases attempts were made to defend against suspension or
revocation of licenses by the "short route" of prohibition or injunction,
4
instead of the "long route" of hearing and judicial review." Where an
agency lacks jurisdiction to do what it is attempting to do a writ of prohibition is, of course, not only an appropriate but also a proper remedy.
In such case the agency is usurping power, and such action should be

prevented. Where jurisdiction to act exists, however, preventing action
by injunction or writ of prohibition or otherwise denies to the agency the
opportunity to perform its function, and denies to the court the benefit
of the administrative judgment in the matter.
Declaratoryand Injunctive Relief
In FloridaHotel and Restaurant Commission v. Marseilles Hotel Co., 15
a suit for declaratory and injunctive relief was brought in a circuit court
by the hotel for an adjudication that the Hotel Commission could not
lawfully revoke the hotel's license, and to enjoin the commission from
continuing with adjudicatory proceedings directed to such a purpose. The
commission charged that one Berr, a hotel employee, had been permitted
by the hotel to accept bets on the hotel premises. Berr had notified the
attorney for the commission that he would refuse to testify at the adminisrative hearing, under a plea of self-incrimination, as to whether or not the
hotel had knowledge of his gambling activities. The hotel's position was
that a hearing in which it would not have the benefit of Bcrr's testimony
would deprive it of due process of law. The Hotel Commission moved to
dismiss the bill. The circuit court denied the motion and temporarily
enjoined the commission from continuing with the revocation proceedings. The supreme court granted certiorari, quashed the order denying
the motion to dismiss, and directed the circuit court to dismiss the complaint. Its position was that the provisions for judicial review of an order
of revocation of a hotel license under chapter 511 Florida Statutes are
adequate to protect the hotel against a denial of due process of law even
if it be assumed, arguendo, that the hotel would be denied a constitu114. E.g., Coleman v. Simmons, 92 So.2d 257 (Fla. 1957); Florida Hotel and
Restaurant Comm'n v. Marseilles Hotel Co., 84 So.2d 567 (Fla. 1956); Edgerton v.
International Co., 89 So.2d 488 (Fla. 1956).
115. See note 114 supra.
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tional guarantee if compelled to defend at the administrative hearing
without Berr's testimony. The court also held that admittance into a
court of equity cannot be gained via the "declaratory relief" route where
the purpose of the suit is to enjoin an administrative hearing.
Writ of Prohibition
In Coleman v. Simmons ' an original prohibition proceeding was
instituted to prevent the Florida Board of Pharmacy from revoking a
pharmacy license on the ground that the issuing agency, a predecessor
board, erred in interpreting the statutory prerequisites when it issued such
license. The predecessor board's interpretation was that graduation from
an accredited school or college of pharmacy was not a mandatory requirenet. The court denied the writ of prohibition and required the licensee
to seek judicial review by appeal in accordance with the applicable statute. 1' 7
Unlike the above case, in Edgerton v. International Company"8 the
issuance of a writ of prohibition to prevent the State Hotel and Restaurant
Commission from proceeding to suspend or revoke a hotel and coffee shop
license was affirmed. Chapter 509 Florida Statutes provides that every
proceeding for suspension or revocation shall be "commenced" within sixty
days after the cause for suspension or revocation arose. In this case the
Commissioner's complaint and notice to show cause had been registered
with sufficient postage and deposited in the mail at Tallahassee for delivery
to the International Company on the sixtieth day. They were delivered
to the company more than sixty days after the alleged cause for suspension
or revocation arose.
The court construed the word "commenced" to mean receipt of the
complaint and notice to show cause by the licensee, and thereupon held
that the proceeding was not timely commenced. This holding may be
explained on the theory that the sixty day requirement is jurisdictional
in nature and the commission in this case was proceeding to exercise
jurisdiction which it did not have.
ADNrINISTRATIVE EXPERIMENTS

The courts generally take a cooperative attitude towards proposed
experiments by administrative agencies in aid of a legislative purpose, but
look with jaundiced eye on proposals that appear to thwart one. Sometimes a proposed experiment thwarts one statutory purpose at the same
time that it aids another. In such case, even if the proposal as made may
be found to be technically within bounds, the court is likely to disapprove
it by reason of the appearance and proximity of evil, particularly where
116. 92 So.2d 257 (Fla. 1957).

117. id. at 258.
118. 89 So2d 488 (Fla. 1956).
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the experiment can be conducted in a manner that eliminates the threatened
subversion of legislative policy. The case of Adams v. Lee,119 which was
concerned with questions of price control and hearings under the Milk
Control Act, is illustrative. Under the act, the milk commission is authorized to alter, revise, or amend an official order theretofore made with
respect to the prices to be charged or paid for milk after investigation,
notice published in a newspaper and public hearing. The obvious purpose
of these limitations is to give interested persons opposed to price change
an opportunity to state their positions and to expose the commission's
proposal to public opinion in advance of the change as a means of assuring
more deliberate action by the commission. In Adams v. Lee the commission was considering a change in its existing price control orders in a
particular milk marketing area. As part of its investigation it desired to
study experimentally the effect of removing all price control in that area.
Accordingly, it adopted a resolution declaring a moratorium on the
enforcement of the applicable price control orders, without altering, revising or amending any of them and without the notice and public hearing
required for alteration, revision or amendment. Certain milk producers
challenged the validity of the resolution. The court held the resolution
to be invalid because of the failure to give the prior notice and hearing
required for changes in price control orders. The court could have taken
the position that the moratorium on enforcement was only a potential
price change and that notice and hearing under the statute are not required
unless the agency makes an actual change. Instead, it properly took the
view which requires the milk commission to respect the legislative policy
as to notice and hearing when it sets in motion competitive forces likely
to produce price change as well as when it changes prices by direct and
immediate action.
ADMINISTRATIVE DISCRETION

The phrase "administrative discretion" in the broad sense in which
it is used here connotes every administrative action which is not governed
by a fixed rule. It includes action which the legislature has expressly
authorized to be taken "in the discretion" of the agency, but is not limited
to such circumstances and includes, in addition, the exercise of judgment
in the application of standards such as "reasonable," "necessary" and
';proper." Accordingly, it would be proper to classify under this heading
and reconsider many of the eases discussed in this survey under other headings to which they are also relevant. Since, however, little if any advantage
is to be derived from doing so, the only cases that will be discussed here
are cases involving the exercise of administrative discretion which are not
considered under other headings.

119. 89 So.2d 217 (Fla. 1956),
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Certification-Compeitive Auto Transportation Service
In Alternan Transport Line v. Carter'-" the supreme court receded
from the position it took in Tarniarni Trail Tours v. Carter'2 as to the
circumstances under which the Railroad and Public Utilities Commission
is authorized to certificate competitive auto transportation services. By the
terms of the statute 122 such service may not be authorized unless "the
existing certificate holder or holders serving such territory fail to provide
services and facilities which may reasonably be required by the Commission." In Redwing Carriersv. Mack" 3 the court had construed this statute
to require that existing carriers have a reasonable opportunity to provide
the adequate services and facilities which they failed to provide before
competitive services are certificated. However, in that case the court did
not have occasion to fully explore the meaning of "reasonable opportunity."
In the Tarniani"'4 case the court was presented with the question of
whether the commission must notify the existing carriers that it requires
particular services or facilities. The statutory words "which may reasonably
be required by the commission" are ambiguous. They may be interpreted
to create a procedural prerequisite of notice of requirements by the commission; they may be interpreted not to create such a prerequisite, but
merely to establish a standard for services and facilities below which
competitive service may be certificated; or they may be interpreted to
establish both a standard and a procedural prerequisite of notice of requirements.
In the Tarniami case,12Th- a majority of the court on rehearing held in
effect that these words created a procedural prerequisite of notice of
requirement by the commission as well as a standard for services and
facilities; and the court made such notice an element of the reasonable
2
opportunity required by the Redwing decision. In the Alterrnan"1
case,
a majority of the court, while adhering to the Redwing principle, construed the statute as not creating an inflexible prerequisite of notice of
requirement by the commission. This decision is likely to spontaneously
stimulate initiation of improved auto transportation services and facilities
by the certificate holders in areas where nieeded, and to expedite procureinent of such services for the public by the commission where not so
initiated.
Discretion to Treat Permit for Hire as Certificate
When an agency has been vested with discretionary powers and has
exercised them arbitrarily or capriciously, the phrase commonly used to
120. 88 So.2d 594 (Fla. 1956).
121. 80 So.2d 322 (Fla. 1954).

122. FLA STAT. § 323.03(3) (1957).
123. 73 So2d 416 (Fla. 1954).
124, 80 So.2d 322 (Fla. 1954),
125. See note 124 supra.
126. 88 So.2d 594 (Fla. 1956).
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describe the action is "abuse of discretion"; but where no discretionary
powers have been granted, the action is only euphemistically so denominated.
The case of Seaboard Airline Railroad v. King'21 may be classified as a
case of abuse of discretion of the latter type with regard to a permit for
hire. Such a permit is less valuable and easier to obtain than a certificate
of public convenience and necessity under Florida law, because a permit
is non-transferable and obtainable without hearing or proof of public need,
while a certificate is a transferable property right obtainable only after
public hearing and formal proof that issuance is required by the public
convenience and necessity. The question in the case concerned the efficacy
of administrative efforts to transform a permit into a certificate by a process
of appellative metamorphesis,
In 1933, permit for hire No. 304, authorizing the hauling of household goods, was issued to one Robinson as a matter of right without notice,
hearing or other formality. In 1943, Robinson, desiring to transfer this
permit to one Sims, applied to the commission jointly with Sims for
approval of such transfer. The application described the permit as a
"limited certificate." The commission approved the transfer and decribed
the transferred authorization as "Limited Common Carrier Certificate
No. 304." In 1947 Sims applied for and was granted an extension of the
above authorization to allow transportation of fertilizer and fertilizer materials. In its order the commission described the extended authorization
as "Limited Common Carrier Certificate of Public Convenience and
Necessity No. 304." In 1953 Sims applied to the commission for approval
of transfer of a portion of the authorization to one Bloodworth. The coinmission approved the application and substituted two authorizations for
the one previously held by Sims, issuing "Certificate of Public Convenience
and Necessity No. 461" to Bloodworth for the assigned portion and
"Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity No. 460" to Sims for
the retained portion. Thereafter Sims, desiring to assign "No. 460" to
Rockana Carriers, Inc., applied to the commission jointly with Rockana
for the approval of the transfer. The commission approved the transfer,
ordering cancellation of Sims' authorization and reissuance to Rockana.
Seaboard Airlines Railroad objected to the action. Oin certiorari, the court
held that the passage of time and failure of interim complaint could not
supply the power in the commission to recognize and deal with a permit
so that it would eventually become a certificate and entitled to the efficacy
of one.
VALIDITY OF ADMINISTRATIVE

RULES AND REGULATIONS

The court decided three interesting cases involving the validity of
administrative rules and regulations. These concerned the railroad and
public utilities commission, the plant board and the citrus commission.
127. 89 So.2d 246 (Fla. 1956).
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Railroad and Public Utilities Commission
In State v. King, 28 a sequel to Seaboard Airline Railroad Co. v. King
above considered, the court held invalid the commission's Rule 61. By this
rule temporary authority to provide auto transportation services may be
granted prior to hearing and determination of public convenience and
necessity when formal application for a permanent certificate has been
made, immediate and urgent need for the transportation has been shown
to exist, and all certificate holders whose rights might be adversely affected
have been notified.
Following the decision in Seaboard Airline Railroad Co. v. King,
Rockana Carriers immediately applied for a permanent certificate of
public convenience and necessity and requested temporary authority to
operate. All certificate holders whose rights might be adversely affected
were notified. The commission granted the temporary authority to Rockana.
Seaboard challenged the validity of rule 61, contending that (1) the commission has no power to grant such temporary authority to a carrier, and
(2) that the provision for notice is inadequate because limited to certificate
holders. The court concluded that the commission has power to grant such
temporary certificates, but that notice of hearing must be given to all transportation companies, not merely certificate holders, and that therefore the
notice provision of the rule was inadequate. By reason of this inadequacy the
court ordered the commission to cancel the temporary authority to Rockana
and to revoke rule 61.
Plant Board-Destruction of Healthy Trees Without Compensation
In Corneal v. State Plant Board 20 the supreme court invalidated a
regulation of the State Plant Board adopted in furtherance of its program
to eliminate the burrowing nematode, a nuisance harmful to citrus and
other trees. The regulation required destruction as a prophylactic measure
of four healthy trees beyond the last one visibly affected by the nematode
without providing for compensation to the owners for either the value
of or the loss of profits from the healthy trees. rhic regulation was held to be
unreasonable and unconstitutional. The fatal defect was the failure to
provide for compensation, at least for the loss of profits which the trees
would be likely to produce before becoming infected.

Citrus Commission-Thickening and Sweetening Chilled Orange Juice
In Florida Citrus Commission v. Golden Gift'8 0 the question raised was
the validity of a regulation of the citrus commission which, inter alia,

128. 93 So.2d 368 (Fa. 1957).
129. 95 So.2d 1 (Fla. 1957).
130. 91 So.2d 657 (Fla. 1957).
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prohibits thickening and sweetening chilled orange juice (a product packaged
in waxed cardboard cartons similar to those employed in the milk industry)
by the use of sugar unless the carton is labelled "substandard," but permits
thickening and sweetening without labelling if frozen concentrated orange
juice is used as the means. Golden Gift, desiring to add sugar to its chilled
orange juice without ruining its sales, attacked the validity of this regulation
as unreasonable and arbitrary because sugar is a substance which is wholesome, nutritional, and innocuous; and as discriminatory because the statute
regulating the canning of orange juice permits sugar to be added to canned
juice without requiring that the can bear the label "substandard." The
commission defended the reasonablencss of the regulation on the ground
that when sugar is added to fresh orange juice the practice is also to add
lime juice to correct the acid content of the product, and water to maintain
the ratio between the acid content and the solids, with the result that the
final product is no longer the chilled single strength orange juice which the
customer believes lie is buying.
In answer to the charge of discrimination, the commission pointed out
that sugar is not permitted to be added to frozen concentrated orange juice
under the statute regulating that scgment of the citrus industry, and contended that chilled orange juice is closer to the frozen concentrated than
to the canned juice. The issue was whether waxed carton orange juice is
governed by the statute regulating canned orange juice, by the statute
applicable to frozen concentrated orange juice, or by neither of these
statutes, and absent a statute specifically applicable to waxed carton orange
juice, whether the regulation in question is valid under the statute vesting
the citrus commission with general powers to regulate the processing of
the citrus fruits for human consumption.
The circuit court found that packaging in waxed cartons is only a new
and successful technique for accomplishing a result unsuccessfully tried
many times before by Florida citrus growers and meets the requirements
of the statutory definition of cained orange juice. On this basis it held
the regulation to be invalid because it was unreasonable and discriminatory.
The supreme court reversed and ruled that waxed carton orange juice
is really a new type of product, that it is subject to regulation under the
commission's general powers, and that the regulation in question is valid
as a reasonable and non-discriminatory exercise of that power. In upholding the regulatoin, the court reiterated the rule that an administrative
regulation is reasonable when it is reasonably related to the ends authorized
and sought to be attained. The ends were declared to be protection of the
citrus industry of the state and the prevention of fraud and deception
in the "chilled orange juice" industry. The regulation was thought to be
reasonably adapted to those ends and not shown to be discriminatory. The
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opinion points out that the marketing in the fall of the year of orange
juice having the appearance of freshly squeezed orange juice, but which
has been sweetened, in competition with oranges which are tart, could
have an adverse effect on the economy of the Florida citrus industry.
ADMINISTRATIVE RULES AND REGULATIONS AS LAW

Bronson v. State of Florida3' illustrates that administrative rules and
regulations may be "law" in the Austinian sense, as a command of the state,
of equal or greater dignity than statutes, and that their status as "law"
depends not upon any characteristics inherent in the rules or regulations
but upon the source from which administrative authority to make them is
derived. That case involved, inter alia, the question of the lawfulness of
an arrest without a warrant for shooting alligators when the shooting was
not in the presence of the arresting officer. Under the common law an
authorized officer may make an arrest in such circumstances if he has
probable cause to believe that a "law" of the state has been violated. In
this case the appellant was arrested because the officer had probable cause to
believe that the defendant had violated a rule of the Game and Fresh Water
Fish Commission regulating the manner and method of taking reptiles.
One of the defenses was that such rule is not a "law" of the state but merely
an administrative regulation. The court rejected this argument stating:
"To agree with appellant would require us to attribute too little dignity to
rules of the Commission."'' ,2 These rules had been adopted pursuant to
Section 30 of article IV of the Constitution of Florida. A prior decision
had held that rules of this administrative agency could not be changed by
the legislature,1 33 that the legislature did not have the power to prescribe
methods of taking fish different from those prescribed by the commssion, 4
and that in case of a conflict between a rule of the commission and an act
of the legislature, the rule of the commission was the "governing law."' 35
In the Bronson case the court went further and held that such rule is
also a "law" within the meaning of the law of arrest without a warrant.
ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES

Administrative agencies are required to act under the applicable
statute governing their activities long before the court is presented with
any occasion to construe it. Accordingly, even agencies that are content to
assume a modest position in the legal hierarchy are required by necessity
to indulge in the art of statutory construction, a function traditionally reserved to the courts exclusively. When the validity of agency action is
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brought in question, it is sometimes defended on the basis of the agency's
construction of the statute, which is then pressed on the court for adoption.
To what extent, if any, does the court acknowledge that administrative
agencies may legitimately construe statutes by necessity and give effect
to their views as "statutory construction"? In some of the cases the court
has said that the administrative construction is a persuasive force and influential, but in others it has completely ignored the question and has proceeded
with the task of judicial construction as it does when a private individual
makes and acts on a private construction of the statute. 'Where influence
and persuasive force has been attributed to the administrative construction,
and it has been adopted, there has been no indication that the result reached
by the court would not have been the same in any event.
In McKinney v. State of Florida ex rel. Ersoff,136 the question was
whether the legislature in exempting restaurants "occupying more than
four thousand square feet of space," from the beverage license limitations
of Section 561.20 Florida Statutes (1957), intended the footage to be
measured on the outside or the inside of the restaurant. The State Beverage
Department has consistently construed the statute to refer to the exterior
walls of the premises. The court approved this construction. Justice Roberts,
speaking for the majority of the court, was content to rest this decision
on the "settled law" that "a construction placed on a statute by a state
administrative officer . . .is a persuasive force and influential with the

courts, when found not to conflict with some provision of the Constitution
or the plain intent of the statute."1T justice Drew, concurring in the
result, did not agree with the reason. "This case boils down to the question
of whether the Act under consideration should receive a strict or a liberal
construction."' 38 In his view "a liberal construction is required."
Baker v. Morrisson13 was concerned with the statutory requirements
for qualification of applicants to take the Board of Pharmacy examination.
Specifically the question was whether under chapter 465, the educational
and experiential specifications are cumulative or alternative. A "period"
placed by the legislative draftsman at the end of the educational requirement
gave hope to an applicant able to meet the experience requirement that
he might not have to meet the educational one as required by the board
of pharmacy. The court, after stating the rule that the legislature is
presumed to know the meaning of words and rules of grammar, and that
the court in determining the intention of the legislature must consider not
only the phraseology of an act, but also the manner in which it is punctuated,
rescued the dual requirement of education and experience with the words
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"Webelieve that this is a case where this Court is warranted in giving the
Statute a meaning different from that indicated by the punctuation."' 140
In Florida Industrial Commission Y.Ciarlante'4' the court approved

the commission's administratve construction of the words "available for
work," as used in section 443.05(3) Florida Statutes (1957), which provides
that unemployment compensation is not payable unless claimant is "available for work." The statute does not define the phrase. The commission
requires that applicants actively seek work to qualify as "available for work."
The question was whether the agency illegally added a requirement not
authorized by the statutes. The court reviewed the judicial decisions
construing similar phrases in other states and found that the statutory
construction by the Commission was in line with that frequently made
elsewhere. Under these circumstances the court saw nothing to require
substituting a different interpretation of the act from that adopted by
the commission entrusted with the responsibility of administering the statute
and, accordingly, sustained its interpretation.
In Florida Industrial Commission v. Manpower Inc.-4 2 the court rejectcd the administrative construction. The case was concerned with the
question of whether the authority of the commission to regulate private
employment agencies extends to a business service organization which provides services under an arrangement whereby the services are performed by
employees of the service organization to whom it pays salaries, the customer
pays for the service at a fixed contract price, and no fee is charged to either
the customer or the employee for providing employment. The question
turned on the statutory definition of the words "employment agency."
The statute defines such phrases to include any person, firm or corporation
which for fee or profit shall "undertake to secure" help for another.1 43 The
commission construed this phrase to include the above type of service
organization. The court concluded that while Manpower "secured help"
it did not "undertake" to secure such help within the meaning of the
statute and its business was therefore not an "employment agency" subject
to regulation by the commission under the above statute. In reaching
its conclusion the court gave consideration to the fact that Manpower's
organization was not susceptible to the abuses which the private employment
agency statute is intended to prevent and that its mode of operation was
not an attempt to circumvent the statute.
In Bedenbaugh v. Adams' "4 the court sustained the State Livestock
Board hog cholera inoculation program against a challenge to its legality
made in injunction proceedings to enjoin the expenditure of county funds for
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the program. In upholding the lawfulness of the program the court relied
on sections of chapter 585, Florida Statutes, which "the parties in the trial
46
court and in the court have overlooked.''
In Hagan v. Florida Railroad and Public Utility Commission14 the
court upheld commission action which gave an unusual meaning to the
concept of "new carrier." The applicant was an auto carrier certified to
provide service over irregular routes to, from and between all points and
places in the state of Florida, subect to a restriction that its motor vehicle
equipment be domiciled only in Tampa. Applicant sought, inter alia,
authorization to transfer the domicile of such equipment to Lakeland,
Florida. To decide this question the commission held a hearing on the
question of whether public convenience and necessity would permit a
"new carrier" in Lakeland and on the basis of such hearing denied the
application. In certiorari proceedings the supreme court practically ignored
the contention that applicant was not a "new carrier" in Lakeland, since
lie was already certified to serve Lakeland.
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